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論　説
Constitutional Law Court in Japan
Yuichiro TSUJI※
Preface
 Japan does not have a court with exclusive jurisdiction over matters of constitutional 
law. Since World War II, the Supreme Court has only ruled around ten cases as 
unconstitutional on their faces, while twelve cases have been declared unconstitutional on 
application. The prominent professor and former Supreme Court Justice Masami Ito stated 
that Japan preferred faceless judges because they are likely to render uniform decisions with 
no unique arguments, and it is futile to ask career-oriented judges to exercise judicial review 
diligently. 
 Judicial review is a mechanism for the judiciary to interact with the people involved in 
the political process.
 In the past, Japanese scholars have discussed the establishment of a constitutional law 
court. In Japanese law, ＂cases and controversies＂ are not documented as a part of 
constitutional law; rather, such documentation is a legislative requirement of the Court Act. 
With an amendment of the Court Act alone, a constitutional law bench exclusively focusing 
on constitutional law matters can be established. Any amendment to the Japanese 
※　Yuichiro Tsuji, Associate Professor at Graduate School of Humanities and Social Science (legal 
major) at University of Tsukuba. J.S.D University of California, Berkeley (₂₀₀₆). LL.M. University 
of California, Berkeley (₂₀₀₅). Master of Law, Kyoto University. The preceding discussion of this 
paper got published at ₃₇ Nanzan Review of American Studies ₅₁ (₂₀₁₅). This paper was modiﬁed 
after presentation international symposium in November, ₂₀₁₅ at Center for Asian Legal Studies 
(CALS) National University of Singapore.
 Special thanks to Prof. Andrew Harding, Prof. Cheryl Saunders, Prof. Albert H.Y. Chen, Prof. Yasuo 
Hasebe, Prof. Tokujin Matsudaira and Mr. Simon Drugda at panel Constitutionalism in East Asia. I 
hugely appreciate Prof. Jiunn-rong Yeh, Prof. Chairark Hahm, and Prof. Woo-Young Rhee at panel 
of Established Constitutional Courts, and all the people who worked and attended this symposium.
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Constitution is highly contentious in contemporary Japan and may cause controversies that 
are unnecessary for the establishment of a constitutional law court.
 The Japanese Supreme Court has been more active recently than it was in the past, 
especially with regard to cases involving equality of voting, which has been dysfunctional in 
the current political process. Family law cases—which change legislative facts 
dramatically—are handled by the Supreme Court in ₂₀₁₅.
 The unique characteristic of justice is gradually becoming apparent. The courts render 
broad decisions while writing separate concurring opinions.
 Therefore, this paper examines the possibility of establishing a court with specific 
jurisdiction over constitutional law. 
I. Danger in Political Process in 2015
1. National Defense and Security Bills in Summer, 2015
 In ₂₀₁₅, eleven national defense and security bills were passed as one bill in the House 
of Representatives. The bill was then sent to be passed in the House of Councilors. The 
Japanese Diet consists of two Houses1, and the majority of seats in the Houses of 
Representatives and Councilors are held by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the 
Komeito Party. Statutes become effective by the approval of the two Houses of the Diet.
 Article ₅₉ (₂) of Japanese Constitution2 provides that if a bill is defeated in the House 
of Councilors, it is possible for the House of Representatives to pass the bill a second time 
＂by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.＂ The bill must be passed by 
the House of Councilors within sixty (₆₀) days after the bill is sent from the House of 
Representatives, according to Article ₅₉ (₄).3 If the bill fails to pass the House of Councilors, 
1　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₄₂. The Diet shall consist of two 
Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors.
2　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₅₉ (₂).A bill which is passed by the 
House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councilors makes a decision different from 
that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of 
Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.
3　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₅₉ (₄). Failure by the House of 
Councilors to take ﬁnal action within sixty (₆₀) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of 
Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to 
constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councilors.
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the bill is discarded and does not carry over to the next session of the Diet. There are ₄₇₅ 
seats in the House of Representative, and the LDP and its coalition partner, the Komeito 
Party, have ₃₂₅ seats.4 It was possible for coalition government to pass the bill again in the 
House of Representatives under Article ₅₉ (₂), but the coalition parties did not use it. The 
LDP announced that it would not use the sixty days of Article ₅₉ (₂) and the second voting 
by a two-thirds of majority of the House of Representatives. This particular approach to the 
second vote meant that the ruling parties avoided further deliberation and the dissenting 
opinion of the parties out of ofﬁce. 
 Instead, the LDP rushed the bill through by using the special committee for security 
bills. The chair of the committee is selected from the party with the majority of seats in the 
Diet. Thus, Yoshitada Kounoike, a member of the LDP in the House of Councilors, was 
selected to be the chair. However, it seemed to him that the government＇s explanation was 
unsatisfactory and lacked consistency in its explanation of the bill. With the last days 
approaching, around September ₁₆, ₂₀₁₅, with deliberations in chaos, a resolution was 
made. The bill was brought to the plenary session of the House of the Councilors 
immediately. The opposition party submitted a censure motion against Minister of Defense 
General Nakatani and Prime Minister Abe in the House of Councilors, as well as a 
resolution of no conﬁdence in the House of Representatives on September ₁₈ to ₁₉, ₂₀₁₅. 
The latter resolution has the power to make the prime minister resign or to dissolve the Diet 
within ten (₁₀) days.5 Both of them were defeated, however. A majority was secured by the 
ruling party and its allying party. The purpose of this motion was to ensure that the bill ran 
out of time.6
 During these events, those who objected to the bill gathered at the Diet for a 
demonstration with many constitutional law scholars. 
4　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₄₃ (₂). The number of the members of 
each House shall be ﬁxed by law. 
 KOSHOKU SENKYO HOU [JAPANESE PUBLIC OFFICER ELECTION ACT], Law No. ₆₀ of 
₂₀₁₅, art.₄. (Japan).
5　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₆₉ (₂).If the House of Representatives 
passes a non-conﬁdence resolution, or rejects a conﬁdence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en 
masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (₁₀) days.
6　KOKKAI HOU [JAPANESE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ACT], Law No.₇₉ of ₁₉₄₇ (now No.₈₆ of 
₂₀₁₄), art.₆₈. (Japan). (any matters left unresolved at the end of one Diet session are not to be carried 
over to the next session).
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 Professor Yasuo Hasebe, Professor emeritus Setsu Kobayashi, and Professor Eiji 
Sasada in particular expressed the opinion in committee that the defense and security bills 
were unconstitutional. It was a big surprise because the scholar who were chosen by the 
ruling party stated publicly that the bills were unconstitutional. The former president of the 
Japanese Supreme Court, Shigeru Yamaguchi, said that if the Abe administration changed 
the traditional interpretation of Article ₉ as a cabinet decision in ₂₀₁₄, the government 
should have explained that the previous governmental opinion was a mistake because the 
budget and related bills were passed under the pre-₂₀₁₄ governmental opinion, which had 
accepted only individual self-defense, not collective self-defense.7
 After the bill passed at the House of Councilors, Abe carried out a cabinet reshufﬂe to 
maintain his level of support in cabinet.8 Many constitutional law scholars and Japanese bar 
associations planned to initiated legal actions to court, alleging that these security defense 
laws were unconstitutional. These people expected the Supreme Court to provide a lead in 
the laws unconstitutional. Even though, after World War II, the Japanese Supreme Court 
adopted the U.S. court system9, the number of unconstitutional decisions has been very 
small compared to the number in the United States. 
2. The Resolution to be Reviewed by the Court
 In Japan, this resolution was presented in chaotic conditions by the LDP and Komeito 
Party; in the past, the Japanese Supreme Court had reviewed one resolution of the Diet 
passed under similar conditions. During Shigeru Yoshida＇s ﬁfth cabinet10, the ruling Liberal 
Party (Jiyu to) and the party out of ofﬁce clashed over an amendment to the National Police 
Act.11 The session of the Diet was repeatedly extended. At that time, there was no limit to 
extending the session in National Assembly Act.12 The ruling party decided in the fourth 
7　Shudanteki Jieiken no Koushi ha Iken [Exercise of Collective Defense Power is Unconstitutional], 
The Asahi Shimbun, (September ₃, ₂₀₁₅). Available at <http://www.asahi.com/articles/
ASH₉₂₅₅ZGH₉₂UTIL₀₂Q.html > (last visited on ₂₆ in December, ₂₀₁₅).
8　The third Abe cabinet has started on October ₇, ₂₀₁₅.
9　The origin and history of Japanese Constitution. Birth of Constitution of Japan [English]. < http://
www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/index.html >. (last visited on ₂₆ in December, ₂₀₁₅).
10　The ﬁfth Yoshida cabinet from May ₂₁, ₁₉₅₃ to December ₁₀,₁₉₅₄.
11　KEISATSU HOU [JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE ACT], Law No.₁₆₂ of ₁₉₅₄ (now No.₁₂₄ of 
₂₀₁₄). (Japan).
12　KOKKAI HOU [JAPANESE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ACT], Law No.₇₉ of ₁₉₄₇ (now No.₈₆ of 
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extension of the session that if the session ran out of time, the bill would expire. In the next 
year＇s plenary session, the Diet needed to deliberate again. 
 Members from the parties out of ofﬁce prevented the chair from entering the ﬂoor and 
announcing the extension of the session. The chair could not enter, but at the entrance 
pointed two ﬁngers and announced an extension of two days, screaming. Only around ten 
members of the ruling parties applauded. 
 The chair and ruling party attended the extended session to pass the amendment of the 
National Police Act. The members of the non- governmental parties did not show upon the 
ﬂoor.
 The Osaka prefecture＇s parliament resolved in June in ₁₉₅₄ that the spending based on 
that resolution of the Diet was effective, and the National Police Act was amended. The 
inhabitants of Osaka prefecture brought a suit for illegal spending under the Local 
Government Act.13
 Supplementary to this is the fact that after World War II, the police system followed the 
United States model, and each unit was based on municipalities, such as city, town, and 
village. The new bill＇s proposal was to rearrange this into a prefectural basis. Each 
prefecture had its own headquarters to control the municipalities in its region. The central 
National Policy Agency controlled and coordinated among prefectures. Democracy and the 
efficiency of the police, central governmental intervention and local government 
independence, clariﬁcation of security responsibility, and political neutrality were balanced 
in this bill. Before World War II, the police force had been used to suppress dissenting 
opinion.14 The opposite parties were afraid of a return to a military state.
 Usually, a plaintiff needs to have standing to bring a suit, according to the Court Act.15 
The Local Government Act is an exception, allowing citizens to bring suits as taxpayers to 
₂₀₁₄), art.₁₂. (Japan).
13　CHIHO JICHI HOU [JAPANESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT], Law No. ₆₇ of ₁₉₄₇ (now 
No.₅₀ of ₂₀₁₅), art.₂₄₂. (Japan).
14　CHIAN IJI HOU [JAPANESE PEACE PRESERVATION ACT], Law No. ₅₄ of ₁₉₄₁ [abolished]. 
(Japan)
15　SAIBANSHO HOU [JAPANESE COURT ACT], Law No. ₄₈ of ₂₀₁₃, art ₃ (₁). (Japan).Courts 
shall, except as speciﬁcally provided for in the Constitution of Japan, decide all legal disputes, and 
have such other powers as are speciﬁcally provided for by law.
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recover illegal spending.16 
 The Supreme Court dismissed the case.17The Supreme Court noted that this amendment 
was passed under proper procedure at the Diet and then promulgated. The court had to 
respect the autonomy of the Houses of the Diet and should not judge the appropriateness of 
the resolution. This bill abolished the municipality policy and established the new 
prefectural police system, which was not counter to Article ₉₂, which stipulated the 
autonomy of the local government.
 In Japan, each House of the Diet has autonomy in managing decision making and is 
beyond judicial review. Resolutions for punishment of members of the Diet are not 
reviewed. The National Assembly Act comprises statutes passed by the two Houses. 
Generally, the National Assembly Act is superior to the regulations of each House. 
According to Professor emeritus Koji Sato18, it is possible to interpret the exclusive matters 
of each House as superior to the National Assembly Act, or just a gentleman＇s agreement. 
There is a precedent case book for each House. Sato states that if the procedural violation of 
the House is so clear that the court may render it unconstitutional because the statute passed 
at the Diet relates to the fundamental rights protected by Japanese Constitution.19
 Returning to the resolution of the Defense and Security bill, the bill was resolved 
through conflict and arguments between members. It is doubtful that the resolution was 
effective. If its committee＇s resolution fails, the statute will not be effective.
 Makoto Ito and other attorneys have brought several suits to some district courts and 
requested that these defense and security laws be ruled unconstitutional.20 The bar 
association at Saitama prefecture21 announced its support for Hasebe and Kobayashi, and 
16　KOJI SATO, KENPO [Constitution] ₅₈₅,₅₈₇ (Seibundo ₂₀₁₁).
17　Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct]Mar. ₇, ₁₉₆₂, Showa ₃₁ (o) no.₆₁, ₁₆ (₃) Saiko Saibansho Minji 
Hanreishu [Minshu]₄₄₅.
18　KOJI SATO, KENPO [Constitution] ₄₆₂ (Seibundo ₂₀₁₁).
19　Id. At ₄₆₄. See also, TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI 
TAKAHASHI, KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPOII [Constitution II] ₂₃₁ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂) .
20　Anpohou Iken Shudan Teiso he [Bringing Suits for Security and Defense Act to Court], The Tokyo 
Shimbun, (December ₂₂, ₂₀₁₅). Available at <http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/₂₀₁₅₁₂/
CK₂₀₁₅₁₂₂₂₀₂₀₀₀₁₂₆.html >. (last visited on ₂₆ in December, ₂₀₁₅).
21　Statement by President of Saitama Bar Association (March ₂₄, ₂₀₁₅). Available at < https://www.
saiben.or.jp/proclamation/view/₂₉₄ >. [Japanese], (last visited on ₂₆ in December, ₂₀₁₅).
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retired judges expressed serious concern about the statutes.22
 Having seen the National Police Act amendment case, rather than contest the actions, 
Kobayashi might be waiting to keep this hot atmosphere until the ₂₀₁₆ election of the 
House of the Councilors.23
3. Unconstitutional Decision in Nagoya High Court Decision
 The preamble of the Japanese Constitution contains the term ＂live in peace.＂24 Before 
Abe＇s cabinet decision of ₂₀₁₄ that the government would newly approve collective defense 
power25, the Japanese government sent the Self Defense Force (SDF) abroad under special 
measures laws26 regarding Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. In order for the 
Japanese government to send ground and maritime SDF to Iraq, the Diet enacted special 
measures statutes in ₂₀₀₃, which was an act valid for four years. The government extended 
once another two years to ₂₀₀₉. 
 The plaintiffs argued that this dispatch was unconstitutional and asked for 
compensation under the National Redress Act27 for the infringement of the right to live in 
22　Saibankan OB ₇₅ nin ga Hantai Seimei [Statement of Opposition by ₇₅ Retired judges], (September, 
₁₅, ₂₀₁₅),The Jiji.com. Available at < http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=₂₀₁₅₀₉/₂₀₁₅₀₉₁₅₀₀₇₅₀>. (last 
visited on ₂₆ in December, ₂₀₁₅).
23　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₄₆. The term of ofﬁce of members of 
the House of Councilors shall be six years, and election for half the members shall take place every 
three years.
24　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], preamble. We desire to occupy an honored 
place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny 
and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of 
the world have the right to live in the peace, free from fear and want.
25　The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) and the Supreme Court are reviewed in Yuichiro Tsuji, 
Constitutional Amendment, ₃₇ Nanzan Review of American Studies ₅₁ (₂₀₁₅). Drafting statute 
process is recorded in examination records of the Diet.
 According to Masahiro Sakata, Ex-director of CBL, stated that only one experience to change its 
ofﬁcial interpretation was Article ₆₆ (₂) of Japanese Constitution.
 MASAHIRO SAKATA, SEIHU NO KENPO KAISHAKU [Constitutional Interpretation by 
Government] ₁₆₂-₄ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₃).
 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₆₆ (₂). The Prime Minister and other 
Ministers of State must be civilians.
26　LAW CONCERNING THE SPECIAL MEASURES ON HUMANITARIAN AND 
RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ. Law No.₁₃₇ of ₂₀₀₃. (Japan) [expired].
27　KOKKA BAISHO HOU [JAPANESE NATIONAL REDERESS ACT], Law No.₁₂₅ of ₁₉₄₇, 
art.₁. (Japan). 
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peace stipulated in the preamble of the Japanese Constitution. They also asked the court to 
announce its unconstitutionality and an injunction against dispatching the SDF. 
 In ₂₀₀₈, the Nagoya high court dismissed the case with a conspicuous note.28 The 
Nagoya court noted that air transportation by the Air SDF was beyond the scope limited by 
Article ₃ of the special measures laws regarding Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance and was an unconstitutional activity under Article ₉ of the Japanese Constitution.
 The court noted no infringement of the right to live in peace and thus dismissed the 
argument seeking the announcement and injunction. The original decision to dismiss the 
damage argument was maintained.
 The Nagoya court classiﬁed Baghdad as a combat region to which it was prohibited to 
send the SDF under the special measures regarding Iraq. This statute distinguished a combat 
region from a non-combat region. The court supported the Cabinet Legislation Bureau＇s 
ofﬁcial announcement that the SDF was to comprise the minimum necessary ability and not 
be an army, as prohibited in Article ₉ of the Japanese Constitution.29 
 The government appears to have won this case, but the court recognized the existence 
of right to live in peace.30
 In the past, the right to live in peace was disputed on the grounds that the content of 
＂living in peace＂ was too speculative and subjective to be recognized as a legally substantial 
right.31
 The losing plaintiff did not appeal because the Nagoya court admitted that the dispatch 
was unconstitutional and illegal but dismissed the argument seeking an announcement and 
injunction. The government won the case but could not appeal. 
28　Nagoya Koto Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.], April ₁₇, ₂₀₀₈. Heisei₁₈ (ne)no.₄₉₉.
29　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₉. Aspiring sincerely to an 
international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
30　supra note₁₆.
31　Mito Chiho Saibansho [Mito Dist.Ct.] Feb.₁₇,₁₉₇₇, Showa ₃₃ (wa)no.₁₃₆,₄₃ (₆) SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] ₅₀₆.
 Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] July, ₇, ₁₉₈₂, Showa ₅₂ (ne)no. ₈₁₇.
 Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist.Ct.] Sep. ₇, ₁₉₇₃, Showa ₅₂ (gyo u) no.₁₆, ₂₃, ₂₄. ₇₁₂ 
HANREI JIHOU [HANJI] ₂₄.
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 This Nagoya decision is one approach by those who think the ₂₀₁₅ defense and 
security law is unconstitutional. The next chapter reviews some decisions on 
unconstitutionality by the Japanese Supreme Court and reviews why the number of such 
decisions by Japanese court has been small. 
II. Unconstitutional Decisions in Japan
 The Japanese Supreme Court has rendered only around nine (₉) cases unconstitutional 
since the Japanese Constitution was promulgated on May ₃, ₁₉₄₇. In December, ₂₀₁₅, the 
Japanese Supreme Court rendered two decisions for family law. The Court upheld Article 
₇₅₀ of the Civil Code32 constitutional, which requires married couple to pick either the 
husband＇s or wife＇s family name. The Court emphasized Japanese tradition to use same 
family name in one couple. On the other hand, the Court struck down Article ₇₃₃ of the 
Civil Code33, which prohibited women from remarrying within six (₆) months of a divorce. 
The Court stated that one hundred (₁₀₀) days was reasonable.
1. After the Unconstitutional Decision
 One of the most famous cases concerns parricide. In this case, a junior high school 
student was raped by her own father. Her mother left after learning her own daughter was 
pregnant by her husband. The daughter tried to run away from her cruel father, but in vain. 
She had ﬁve children; two of them were passed away. Another six (₆) were aborted, and she 
underwent an operation to be sterilized. She found a good man in her workplace and was 
eager to get married with him when she was twenty-nine (₂₉) years old. She did not run 
away because her sister might be put in danger. She told her father about her work 
colleague. He freaked out, put her in conﬁnement, and raped her. She was so tired of the 
abuse that she strangled him. At that time, she was ₂₉ years old, and his father was ₅₃ years 
old.
 She was prosecuted under Article ₂₀₀ of the Criminal Code34, which stipulates that a 
32　MIN POU [JAPANESE CIVIL CODE], Law No. ₉₄ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₇₅₀. (Japan).
33　MIN POU [JAPANESE CIVIL CODE], Law No. ₉₄ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₇₃₃. (Japan).
34　KEI HOU [JAPANESE CRIMINAL CODE], Law No.₈₆ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₂₀₀. (Japan).
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person who kills their own parent or their spouse＇s parent shall be punished by death or 
imprisonment for life with hard labor. Article ₁₉₉ of the Criminal Code35 stated that a person 
who killed another person shall be punished by death or imprisonment with hard labor life 
or for not less than three (₃) years. Some approaches were made to reduce her sentence. 
Article ₃₉ (₂)36 states that an act of diminished capacity shall lead to a reduced punishment 
as necessary. Article ₆₈ (₂)37 states that when imprisonment with or without work for life is 
to be reduced, it shall be reduced to imprisonment with or without work for a deﬁnite term 
of not less than ₇ years. Article ₆₆38 allows for a reduction in punishment in light of 
extenuating circumstances. Her sentence would be three and half years with no stay of 
execution.
 In ₁₉₇₃, a majority opinion of the Supreme Court39 upheld Article ₂₀₀ of the Criminal 
Code unconstitutional under Article ₁₄40 of the Japanese Constitution. The purpose of 
Article ₂₀₀ was permissible but the punishment was impermissibly too heavy compared to 
regular murder Article ₁₉₉.41
 After this decision, in ₁₉₉₅, Article ₂₀₀ was abolished by the Diet. From the Supreme 
Court decision until ₁₉₉₅, the prosecutor respected this decision and used Article ₁₉₉ for 
cases where a son or daughter had killed his or her father or mother. Constitutional law 
scholars think that the legislature will soon amend or abolish the statute that was held 
unconstitutional and respect the decision of unconstitutionality, and the administrative 
branch will refrain from its application until the statute is amended or abolished.42
35　KEI HOU [JAPANESE CRIMINAL CODE], Law No.₈₆ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₁₉₉. (Japan).
36　KEI HOU [JAPANESE CRIMINAL CODE], Law No.₈₆ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₃₉ (₂). (Japan).
37　KEI HOU [JAPANESE CRIMINAL CODE], Law No.₈₆ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₆₈ (₂). (Japan).
38　KEI HOU [JAPANESE CRIMINAL CODE], Law No.₈₆ of ₂₀₁₃, art. ₆₆. (Japan).
39　Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] April. ₄, ₁₉₇₃, Showa ₄₅ (a) no.₁₃₁₀, ₂₇ (₃) Saiko Saibansho Keiji 
Hanreishu [Keishu] ₂₆₅.Article ₂₀₀ of the Japanese Criminal Code contradicts Article ₁₄ of the 
Japanese Constitution and was held to be unconstitutional. This case is called the Parricide case.
40　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₁₄. All of the people are equal under 
the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, 
creed, sex, social status or family origin. Peers and peerage shall not be recognized. No privilege 
shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid 
beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.
41　In this case, the defendant had no mental disorder, but the Supreme Court ruled her sentence as 
two and a half years and with stay of execution for three years by using Article ₁₉₉.
42　TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, KATSUTOSHI 
TAKAMI, KENPOII [Constitution II] ₃₂₀-₃₂₈ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂).
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 It still took ₂₂ years for the legislature to amend Article ₂₀₀ of the Criminal Code, 
however. This shows that there are still conservative members in the Diet who resist 
amendments to the statutes. 43
 Soon after unconstitutional decision of Article ₇₃₃ of the Civil Code by the Japanese 
Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice gave notices to agencies that it should accept the 
registration of remarriage from women one hundred (₁₀₀) days passed after their divorces. 
The Civil Code is expected to be amended soon. 
III. Japanese Judicial Review: Concrete or Abstract
1. Concrete Judicial Review
 The Japanese judiciary reviews the constitutionality of public actions. Article ₇₆44 
states that ＂the whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts 
as are established by law.＂ Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe wrote in his textbook45 that the 
mission of judicial power is to interpret and apply the law and then solve concrete cases.
 Introducing U.S. constitutional studies, Koji Sato46 also says that the originally 
judiciary system only serves adversarial parties in cases and controversies. Parties in cases 
and controversies have a concrete personal stake in the outcome of the case. He 
characterized Japanese judicial review as a concrete judicial review or incidental judicial 
review. Constitutional problems arise as incidental issues in civil, criminal, or administrative 
litigation.47 
 The judiciary adjudicates each case and controversy between adversarial presentations 
of competing arguments in definite, concrete disputes, to reach its final judgment.48 The 
43　Akira Momochi, To protect family ties, The Sankei News, (December ₂₂, ₂₀₁₅). Available at 
<http://www.sankei.com/column/news/₁₅₁₂₂₂/clm₁₅₁₂₂₂₀₀₀₁-n₁.html>. (last visited on ₂₆ in 
December, ₂₀₁₅). He supported constitutional decision of Article ₇₅₀. 
44　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₇₆ (₁). The whole judicial power is 
vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.
45　NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPO [Constitution]₃₂₆,₃₂₉ (Iwanami Shoten ₂₀₁₁).This book is still 
being edited by Prof. Kazuyuki Takahashi after Prof. Ashibe passed away.
46　KOJI SATO, KENPO [Constitution] ₁₅, ₆₂₀- (Seibundo ₂₀₁₁).
47　TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, KATSUTOSHI 
TAKAMI, KENPOII [Constitution II] ₂₇₁- (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂).
48　It seems that Prof. Koji Sato regards Muskrat v. United States, ₂₁₉  U.S. ₃₄₆  (₁₉₁₁ ) as important 
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judiciary has a duty to ﬁnd and pronounce the law as applied to particular facts of the case, 
after hearing the legal arguments of the adversarial parties. 
 Sato and Ashibe introduced the famous U.S. case of Marbury v. Madison,49 a good 
example of judicial review, showing that advisory opinions are not the business of the 
judiciary. Hypothetical questions violate case and controversy, erode judicial power, and are 
not solved by the judiciary. Imaginary cases are prohibited as well.
 In the United States, the term ＂case and controversy＂ is a constitutional requirement in 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution50. In the United States, there is no constitutional court 
with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional matters, independent of the Supreme Court. 
Another difference is that there is no provision in the U.S. Constitution for judicial review. 
U.S. judicial review was derived from case law in Marbury v. Madison. 
2. Abstract Judicial Review
 In Japan, German constitutional law studies have also advanced. The German type of 
judicial review is called ＂abstract review.＂ There is a federal constitutional court in German 
called the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which has exclusive jurisdiction given by the basic 
law of Germany, the Grundgesetz.51
 In German judicial review, the minority of the parliament can bring constitutional 
litigation in the absence of case and controversy. One-third of the federal parliament 
(Bundestag) or member states (Bundeslander) are eligible to demand judicial review of 
statutes. This is called ＂proceedings on the constitutionality of statutes.＂
 In addition, a party claiming that his or her constitutional rights are infringed in civil, 
criminal, or administrative cases is eligible to bring a constitutional claim to the 
constitutional court, which has exclusive jurisdiction under federal German constitutional 
law. When this claim is referred to the constitutional court, the proceedings stop until the 
decision is given, in a proceeding called constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde).52 
for Japanese judiciary.
49　Marbury v. Madison, ₅ U.S. ₁₃₇ (₁₈₀₃). In the latest edition, NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPO 
[Constitution] (Iwanami Shoten ₂₀₁₅), Marbury v. Madison was deleted.
50　Article ₃ of the U.S. Constitution.
51　Article ₉₃ of German Constitution.
52　Article ₁₀₀ (₁) of German Constitution.
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 In Germany, any political party that has the goal of infringing the free and democratic 
fundamental order (Die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung) or endangering the 
existence of Germany is presumed to be unconstitutional. The federal constitutional court 
reviews its constitutionality when the federal parliament or federal government brings a 
claim. This is called fortiﬁed democracy (Streitbare Demokratie).53
 In the Japanese Constitution, there is no special provision regarding political parties. 
Article ₂₁ of the Japanese Constitution54 guarantees freedom of assembly and association, 
and there are no statutes against Nazis. There are some statutes that control political parties, 
such as the Public Officer Election Act55 and the Party Subsidies Law.56 Thus, political 
parties that could not exist in Germany may be allowed to exist in Japan. 
3. Text of Japanese Constitutional Law and Reform of the Judicial System
 Under the Japanese Constitution, judicial review is provided in Article ₈₁57, which 
stipulates that, ＂the Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or ofﬁcial act.＂ Unlike the U.S. Constitution, 
the term ＂case and controversy＂ does not exist in the Japanese Constitution. 
 Paragraph ₁ in Article ₃ of the Japanese Court Act58 provides that, ＂ [c]ourts shall, 
except as speciﬁcally provided for in the Constitution of Japan, decide all legal disputes, 
and have such other powers as are speciﬁcally provided for by law.＂ If the term ＂dispute＂ in 
the Court Act is interpreted as a counterpart of case and controversies in the U.S. 
Constitution, Japanese judicial review would be a U.S. type of judicial review. Nonetheless, 
case and controversy maybe or may not be still a legislative—or constitutional—
requirement in Japan.
 In the case of the amendment to the National Police Act, the taxpayer was able to bring 
53　Article ₉ (₂), ₁₈, ₂₁, ₈₁ (₄) of German Constitution.
54　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₂₁ (₁). Freedom of assembly and 
association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.
55　KOSHOKU SENKYO HOU [JAPANESE PUBLIC OFFICER ELECTION ACT], Law No. ₆₀ of 
₂₀₁₅. (Japan).
56　SEITO JOSEI HOU [JAPANESE PARTY SUBSIDIES LAW], Law No.₆₉ of ₂₀₁₄. (Japan).
57　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art.₈₁. The Supreme Court is the court of 
last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or ofﬁcial act.
58　SAIBANSHO HOU [JAPANESE COURT ACT], Law No. ₄₈ of ₂₀₁₃, art ₃ (₁). (Japan).
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a suit even though the taxpayer had no concrete and legal dispute in the case. This is called 
＂objective litigation,＂ intended to make the government observe the law. 
 There are two types of objective litigation in Japan. One is people＇s litigation, which 
itself provides two kinds of litigation under Article ₅ of the Japanese Administrative Case 
Litigation Act (JACLA).59
 One of these is resident litigation, under which any inhabitant who is a voter or 
candidate for public office may bring a suit for damage for illegal spending of the 
government or a ﬁnancial accounting action. Compared to the citizen suits in the United 
States, the suit is limited to illegal government spending or a ﬁnancial accounting action.
 In addition, the voter can bring a suit to contest the validity of the election, which is 
provided for in Articles ₂₀₃, ₂₀₄, ₂₀₇, and ₂₁₁ of the Public Ofﬁcer Election Act.60
 Sato61 explains that as an organization of legal principle and order, the legislature may 
approve objective litigation as a legal policy as long as it maintains legal principle. The 
purpose is to keep the administrative power within the law and to correct illegal activity. 
 Besides people＇s litigation, interagency litigation is included in objective litigation. 
Disputes between governmental agencies are not a concern of the judiciary. Article ₆ of the 
JACLA and Articles ₁₇₆ (₆), ₂₅₁-₅, and ₂₅₂ of the Local Government Act62 allow this 
litigation. 
A. The Number of Constitutional Decisions in Japan 
 Japanese constitutional law studies have focused on one question relating to whether 
Japanese courts have worked well.63
 U.S. professor Alexander Bickel explained that the mission of the judiciary was to 
59　GYOSEI JIKEN SOSHOU HOU [JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE LITIGATION ACT], 
Law No.₅₉ of ₂₀₁₅, art ₅, ₆. (Japan).
60　KOSHOKU SENKYO HOU [JAPANESE PUBLIC OFFICER ELECTION ACT], Law No. ₆₀ of 
₂₀₁₅, art.₂₀₃, ₂₀₄, ₂₀₇ and ₂₁₁. (Japan).
61　KOJI SATO, KENPO [Constitution]₆₂₃- (Seibundo ₂₀₁₁).
 TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, KATSUTOSHI 
TAKAMI, KENPOII [Constitution II]₂₉₆ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂).
62　CHIHO JICHI HOU [JAPANESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT], Law No. ₆₇ of ₁₉₄₇ (now 
No.₅₀ of ₂₀₁₅), art.₁₇₆ (₆), ₂₅₁-₁,₂₅₂. (Japan).
63　SHOUJIRO SAKAGUCHI, RIKKENSHUGI TO MINSHUSHUGI [Constitutionalism and 
Democracy] (Nihon Hyoronsha ₂₀₀₁). Professor Sakaguchi focuses on legitimacy of judicial review. 
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develop dialogue between the government and the people.64 The U.S. Supreme Court 
renders ₇₀–₉₀ decisions a year. Cases are selected through certiorari. In the case that a 
conflict arises among federal courts of appeals or between state courts in two states, or 
between a state＇s highest court and a federal court of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court issues 
a writ of certiorari to order these lower courts to send such cases to it to review the 
decisions.65
 The writ of certiorari performs the function of selecting only important constitutional 
law issues. The basis of certiorari is called the ＂rule of four,＂ meaning that the U.S. Supreme 
Court accepts an appeal if four Justices approve hearing the case. It is said that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has played a role in sending a message every year with regard to 
controversial issues in American society through its judicial review. By contrast, the 
Japanese Supreme Court has made only around ten decisions of unconstitutionality since 
₁₉₄₇. 
 There are other cases in which the Supreme Court has held statutes constitutional but 
their application to concrete cases unconstitutional. The small number of unconstitutional 
cases is explained by the fact that the Japanese Supreme Court adjudicates constitutional 
issues at the grand bench, composed of ₁₅ Supreme Court Justices, divided into three petty 
benches. The grand bench calls for all its members to deal with constitutional problems or to 
change a decision made in the past. There has been criticism that the Japanese Supreme 
Court has not played a role in connecting the government and people through constitutional 
decisions, a role it ought to play, according to Professor Bickel＇s description.66
B. National Police Reserve Case: The Possibility of a German Court in Japan 
 Some believe that the Japanese Supreme Court does not function as well as the U.S. 
Supreme Court does. The Japanese Supreme Court does not have the certiorari system 
which screens for unnecessary appeals, and it is said that the load of cases to be dealt with is 
too heavy.67
64　ALEXANDER BICKEL,THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS ₁₆ (Yale University Press, ₁₉₆₂).
65　Rule ₁₄ of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
66　HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPO [CONSTITUTION]₄₆₅ (Kobundo ₂₀₁₅). Judiciary takes a role 
to earn the trust of Japanese people through its decision.
67　Morio Takeshita, Saiko Saibansho ni taisuru Jouso Seigen [Restriction of the Appeal to the 
Supreme Court], ₅₇₅ NBL ₃₉, ₅₇₆ NBL ₄₄ (₂₀₁₅).
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 The famous National Police Reserve case is key in determining whether the Japanese 
Supreme Court works as well as the German Federal Constitutional Court does.
 In ₁₉₅₀, the Korean Peninsula/Korean War occurred between North Korea, supported 
by the Soviet Union, and South Korea, supported by the United States. The United States 
sent armed forces that were stationed in Japan to the Korean Peninsula, leaving Japan＇s 
defenses weak. The General Headquarters occupying Japan at the time ordered the Japanese 
government to establish the National Police Reserve. Arguing that the establishment of the 
National Police Reserve contradicted Article ₉ of the Constitution of Japan, Mosaburo 
Suzuki, the head of the Japanese Socialist Party, brought an action directly to the Supreme 
Court. The action was dismissed by the Supreme Court on the grounds of absence of a 
concrete case. 
 The Supreme Court68 said that it had no authority to determine the constitutionality of 
any law or the like in the abstract. The plaintiff argued that the Japanese Supreme Court had 
the additional character, like the German Federal Constitutional Court, of reviewing abstract 
issues without a concrete case. The Supreme Court admitted that some other countries 
vested the authority for abstract judicial review in special judicial courts. However, the 
authority that had been vested in Japan＇s courts under the system now ＂in force consists of 
the authority to exercise judicial power, and for judicial power to be invoked,＂ a concrete 
legal dispute must be brought. The courts cannot exercise power ＂whereby, in the absence of 
such a concrete legal dispute, they render an abstract judgment anticipating the future and 
relating to a doubtful or controversial matter concerning the interpretation of the 
Constitution or other law, order, and the like. In actuality, the Supreme Court possesses the 
power to review the constitutionality of laws, orders, and the like, but that authority may be 
exercised only within the limits of judicial power; in this respect, the Supreme Court is no 
different from the lower courts..＂
 This explanation has led to much legal discussion among Japanese constitutional law 
professors. For example, according to Professor Hidenori Tomatsu, this debate was so old 
that amendment of Japanese Constitution is required for the Japanese Supreme Court to use 
68　Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct.₈, ₁₉₅₂, Showa ₂₇ (ma) no.₂₃, ₆ (₉) Saiko Saibansho Minji 
Hanreishu [Minshu]₇₈₃.
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abstract review today.69 In Japan, case and controversy is a legislative provision of the Court 
Act, not stipulated in text of Japanese Constitution. Consequently, constitutional law 
scholars specializing in German law have argued for amending the Japanese Court Act and 
providing for special proceedings, like the Verfassungsbeschwerde.70
C. Faceless Judges: Reform of the Judicial System
 Some scholars of U.S. law would agree about the heavy load of the Japanese Supreme 
Court.71 Justice Masami Ito outlined the character of Japanese court justice. Ito was a Tokyo 
university professor of U.S. law and was later appointed as a Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Ito explained that an ideal judge in Japan was regarded as a faceless individual who 
rendered uniform, not unique, decisions in common with other judges.72 Judges in Japan 
must follow only their professional conscience and the Constitution, under Article ₇₆. He 
characterized the Japanese courts as working like the European courts and felt it was 
pointless to ask judges to play the role of judicial activist, like the Warren Court in the 
United States, which rendered remarkable decisions on controversial issues in American 
society, such as Brown v. Board of Education cases.73
 One reform plan for the Court Act has been discussed (The Naka-Nikai an) to redeﬁne 
the membership and mission of the grand bench and the petty bench. Under this proposal, 
the grand bench is to consist of nine Justices and petty bench of thirty judges. These benches 
are different organizations, with the Justices of the grand bench dealing exclusively with 
69　HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPO [CONSTITUTION]₄₆₃ (Kobundo ₂₀₁₅). Tomatsu believes that 
only early stage of Japanese Constitution, it was possible to think that Japanese judiciary had abstract 
review until National Police Reserve Case was rendered.
 MASATO ICHIKAWA, KENPO [CONSTITUTION]₃₅₀ (Shinseisha ₂₀₁₄). Ichikawa and Tomatsu 
emphasize the National Police Reserve Case.
70　Tsuyoshi Hatajiri, Shihousaibanshogata Ikensinsasei ni okeru Saiko Saibansho no Yakuwari [The 
Role of the Supreme Court in Judicial Review], KOJI TONAMI, et.al, KENPO NO KIHANRYOKU 
TO KENPO SAIBAN ₃₃₅ [PROJECT:DIE NORMATIVE RAFT DER VERFASSUNG] (Shinzansha 
₂₀₁₃).
71　supra note ₆₆.
72　MASAMI ITO, SAIBANKAN TO GAKUSHA NO AIDA [Between Justice and Scholar] ₁₀₆-₁₃₇ 
(Yuhikaku ₁₉₉₃).
 See also, Comment by Koji Sato at the House of Councilors, ₂₇ in Feb.in ₂₀₀₂. (Japanese). Available 
at < http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/₁₅₄/₀₀₅₁/₁₅₄₀₂₂₇₀₀₅₁₀₀₂a.html >. (last visited on 
₂₆ in December, ₂₀₁₅).
73　Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, ₃₄₇  U.S. ₄₈₃  (₁₉₅₄ ),Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, ₃₄₉  U.S. ₂₉₄  (₁₉₅₅ ).
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constitutional issues.
 The reason for this proposal is that in Japan the process of the petty court is routine, 
whereas the work of grand bench is thought of as for very special occasions.74 Even though 
the grand bench is requested to adjudicate constitutionally important cases, the grand bench 
usually expands the scope of precedents with minor modiﬁcations. The three petty courts 
substantively adjudicate constitutional cases under the current system. 
 The written decision cites prior precedent as a ground of reasoning, but sometimes it is 
too abstract and requires even constitutional scholars to read between the lines of court 
opinion. The differences between the case at hand and the precedent are not clarified 
sufﬁciently.75
 Ex-Justice Tokiyasu Fujita stated that Justice of the Supreme Court might take negative 
attitude to reverse the prior decisions, and they tend to postpone the conclusion in a future. 
For Japanese judiciary there might be the third approach between the United States and 
German federal constitutional court.
IV. Justiciability
1. Requirement of judicial review 
 For the judiciary to begin a judicial review in Japan, there are several requirements: 
standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question.
A. Standing and the Naganuma Nike Case
 Standing requires the plaintiff to prove the injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 
The injury in fact is direct damage that includes economic, aesthetic, and environmental 
interests. The plaintiff in this case suffered this kind of damage as a result of the defendant＇s 
conduct. There are several exceptions for standing: third party standing, taxpayer standing, 
and congressionally created standing as objective litigation.
 In the Naganuma Nike case, in the middle of the Cold War, to create a defense system 
in Hokkaido against the Soviet Union, the government lifted a permit on the national 
74　TOKUJI IZUMI, WATASHI NO SAIKO SAIBANSHO RON [My Supreme Court Theory] ₁₇₆-₁₈₀ 
(Nihon Hyoronsha ₂₀₁₃).
75　TOKIYASU FUJITA,SAIKOUSAI KAISOU ROKU [Reminiscences of the Supreme Court] ₁₅₃-
₁₆₁ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂).
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windbreak forest to construct a missile base. This forest had been cultivated as a water 
resource. The inhabitants near this base brought action, arguing that its construction 
contravened Article ₉. As the owner of this forest was the government, there was no injury 
in fact. The cause of action was the right to live in peace, as noted in the preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution. The plaintiff added the complaint that lifting permission would lead 
to ﬂooding and other natural disasters. 
 The Supreme Court76 alternative facility to reduce the dangers of ﬂood and drought was 
constructed, and the interest in bringing litigation disappeared.
B. Mootness and Ripeness
 To adjudicate in court, case and controversy issues may exist at all stages of review, not 
just when the complaint is filed. For example, if the plaintiff dies and cannot challenge 
statutes, the case is dismissed. There are several exceptions for mootness, however. First, 
there is an exception for cases capable of repetition yet evading review. Second, exceptions 
are made for cases in which the defendant voluntarily and temporarily changed his conduct. 
Third, an exception is made for cases in which major issues are resolved and collateral 
consequences to the party occur. In the United States, class actions are the fourth exception, 
but the Japanese court system does not have class actions with some exception of special 
statutes.77
 In ₁₉₅₃, the Supreme Court78 dismissed a case, known as the May Day Parade case, by 
mootness. The organizer of a labor union ﬁled a permit for assembly in the public square in 
front of the imperial palace on the ﬁrst day of May (May Day). The welfare minister denied 
the permit. Labor unions in Japan usually asked workers to assemble to protest or march on 
this day, which has special meaning for labor unions; labor unions in Japan are not industrial 
unions but enterprise labor unions.79
 The Supreme Court dismissed the case on the grounds that the case was moot. Japanese 
76　Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct]Sep.₉, ₁₉₈₂, Showa ₅₂ (gyo tsu) no.₅₆, ₃₆ (₉) Saiko Saibansho Minji 
Hanreishu [Minshu]₁₆₇₉.
77　SHOUHISHA KEIYAKU HOU [THE CONSUMER CONTRACT ACT],Law No. ₆₁ of ₂₀₀₀. 
(Japan), art.₁₃.
78　Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct]Dec.₂₃, ₁₉₅₃, Showa ₂₇ (o) no.₁₁₅₀, ₇ Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu 
[Minshu]₁₅₆₁.
79　In Japan, labor union groups have been organized within an individual company. Therefore, it had 
special meaning for each labor union to get together in one place, and sent message of the solidarity.
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constitutional law professors think that this case constitutes an exception of mootness: being 
capable of repetition, yet evading review, like Roe v. Wade80 in the United States.
Another requirement is ripeness. The case and controversy standard requires that an actual 
immediate threat of harm exists for a court to provide resolution. 
2. Political Question
 The Sunagawa case81 addressed the security82 treaty concluded between Japan and the 
United States in September ₁₉₅₁. The Japanese Supreme Court avoided reviewing the 
constitutionality of the treaty by the political question doctrine, that is, ＂decisions concerning 
a fundamental governmental action with a highly political character should not be made by 
the judiciary. Instead, the political branches of government, which are accountable to the 
people directly, or ﬁnally the people themselves should make these decision,＂ even if the 
dispute has case and controversies.83
 In the Sunagawa case, the government began a survey of the property of Tachikawa 
airport in July ₁₉₅₇ for the purposes of constructing a U.S. armed forces base at that site. A 
critical public objected to the base construction and protested near the fence on the property 
of the airport. After a while, the protestors wrecked the fence and trespassed on the property 
within an area of several tens of meters. They were arrested and prosecuted under the Law 
for Special Measures Concerning Criminal Cases to Implement the Administrative 
Agreement under Article III of the security treaty.84 
 The defendants claimed that the prosecution contravened Article ₃₁85 of the Japanese 
Constitution and that the U.S. army forces stationed in Japan were unconstitutional under 
80　Roe v. Wade, ₄₁₀ U.S. ₁₁₃ (₁₉₇₃).
81　Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] Dec. ₁₆, ₁₉₅₉, Showa ₃₄ (a) no.₇₁₀, ₁₃ Saiko Saibansho Keiji 
Hanreishu [Keishu] ₃₂₂₅.
82　Kyu Nihonkoku to Amerika Gasshukoku to no aidano anzen hoshou jouyaku [The old security 
treaty between Japan and the United States], Japan-U.S., ₂₈ April ₁₉₅₂, Treaty No. ₆, ₁₉₅₂.
83　Taisuke Kamata, Adjudication and the Governing Process, PERCY LUNEY,JR AND KAZUYUKI 
TAKAHASHI, JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ₁₅₆-₇ (University of Tokyo Press ₁₉₉₃).
84　This chapter is discussed in Yuichiro Tsuji, Amendment of the Japanese Constitutional Law, 
₃₇Nanzan Review of American Studies ₅₁ (₂₀₁₅).
85　NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION],art. ₃₁ (Japan). No person shall be 
deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to 
procedure established by law.
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Article ₉.
 The Japanese Supreme Court held in ₁₉₅₉ that Article ₉ renounces ＂the so-called war 
and prohibits the maintenance of the so-called war potential, but certainly there is nothing in 
it which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. 
The paciﬁsm advocated in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or 
nonresistance.＂ According to the Sunagawa decision, paragraph ₂ of Article ₉ did not 
＂include foreign armed forces even if they are to be stationed in our country.＂
 The Japanese Supreme Court determined that the court could review the treaty between 
Japan and the other state but avoided determining the constitutionality of the treaty. 
 The Japanese Supreme Court said that in the formulation of the treaty, ＂the Cabinet of 
the Japanese Government then in power, negotiated with the United States on a number of 
occasions in accordance with the constitutional provisions, and ﬁnally concluded the same 
as one of the most important national policies. It is also a well-accepted public knowledge 
that … the question of whether the treaty was in accord with the Constitution was carefully 
discussed by both Houses and ﬁnally ratiﬁed by the Diet as being a legal and proper treaty.＂
 Constitutional law scholars think that Sunagawa case used the Japanese ＂political 
question＂ with the discretion of the legislature.86 The Supreme Court explained that the 
courts may review a case unless it is remarkably clearly unconstitutional for the court to 
review the case. The criteria of remarkably clear unconstitutionality are not clear. The 
political question approach would be justiﬁed on the ground that the inherent constraint of 
the judiciary requires it not to intervene too much and to leave it to the people＇s decision, 
given the accountability of the other two branches of the government. Constitutional law 
scholars believe that the political question approach provides an excuse for the judiciary to 
avoid confronting parties who have standing. Thus, if there are other ways to avoid a 
decision than the political question, the court should use it, such as legislative discretion or 
the autonomy of other branches of the government. Koji Sato argues that the court should 
not abuse the political question in cases easily.87
86　TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, KATSUTOSHI 
TAKAMI, KENPOII [Constitution II] ₂₈₃ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂). Nonaka states that in Japan political 
question doctrine was used only for disputes regarding Self Defense Force. ＂Highly political＂ is too 
weak for courts to avoid review.
87　KOJI SATO, KENPO [Constitution]₆₄₅ (Seibundo ₂₀₁₁).
86
筑波法政第₆₆号（₂₀₁₆）
Conclusion
 In this paper, the possibility is discussed of a Japanese constitutional court that has 
exclusive jurisdiction to review constitutional law matters.
 It is possible to establish a constitutional law court without amending the Japanese 
Constitution. By amending the term, ＂all legal disputes＂ stipulated in the Court Act and 
preparing special procedures and the reorganization of the constitutional bench＇s hierarchy, 
at the top of which is the Supreme Court, it would be possible for a special bench of the 
Supreme Court to focus on constitutional law cases. It depends on the question what is core 
of judiciary in Japanese Constitution. By pressure from ＂we＂ the people, the Supreme Court 
may change its attitude. There might be the middle approach between the United States and 
Germany.
 The number of unconstitutional law decisions has been too small in Japan. 
Unconstitutionality decisions require the legislative branch to amend or abolish a statute 
quickly, and the administrative branch to refrain from applying an unconstitutional statute. 
The Supreme Court has already sent messages to the people concerning how Article ₂₀₀ of 
the Criminal Code should be.
 Professor emeritus and ex-justice of the Supreme Court Masami Ito has argued that the 
Japanese courts have followed the career system of European countries, and that decisions 
that are tasteless and odorless might be preferred; he used the term ＂faceless judges.＂ This 
issue must be reviewed by the principle of judiciary independence at another opportunity, 
but when the political process between the people and legislature malfunctions, the role of 
the court is still expected.88 The legal stability undermined by sudden changes in cabinet 
decisions might require the court to demand a fair explanation of the legislature.
 In Japanese constitutional law, judicial review has been discussed in terms of the issue 
of the constitutionality of the SDF under Article ₉ of the Japanese Constitution. The 
prospect for suits seeking to rule defense and peace laws unconstitutional is not promising. 
The autonomy of each House of the Diet undermines the possibility of judicial review. The 
88　YOUICHI HIGUCHI, NIHON KOKU KENPOU MATTOU NI GIRON SURUTAMENI [Discussing 
Seriously about Japanese Constitution] ₁₂₈-₁₃₀ [Misuzu Shobou ₂₀₁₅].
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political question doctrine admits standing but may dismiss a case on merit. Legislative 
discretion is also another factor.
 The Nagoya high court decision rejected the remedy of seeking damages but announced 
in dicta that dispatching the SDF was unconstitutional and approved the right to live in 
peace. This decision required standing.
 The mission of the constitutional law scholars is to bridge the gap between ordinary 
people and the Constitution, send their detailed internal analysis to other country＇s 
constitutional researchers. In ₂₀₁₅ the Japanese Constitution is a hotly debated topic among 
people, the mission and duty of the constitutional law scholar are important issues.
 Japanese constitutional scholars strongly believe that one mission of the court is to 
determine what the law is and to send a message through its decisions on disputed issues to 
cultivate democracy. 
 (Associate professor, University of Tsukuba)
